In R v. Cheshire (1991), under what condition would negligent treatment break the chain of causation?

In the context of R v. Cheshire (1991), the principle related to breaking the chain of causation hinges on whether the negligent treatment is deemed to be unrelated and entirely independent of the initial acts. According to legal precedents, for negligent medical treatment to break the chain of causation, it must be shown that the treatment did not merely arise from the original injury but rather represented a separate and independent cause.

In this case, if negligent treatment is found to be completely unrelated to the initial act, it would signify that the original act of harm is no longer a contributory factor to the eventual outcome for the victim. This principle aligns with the idea that causation can only be severed where the subsequent events or actions are sufficiently distinct from the first act that they introduce an independent source of harm.

While the other options touch on situations that could potentially affect causation, they do not meet the stringent requirement of being entirely independent and unrelated. For example, severe negligence (mentioned in one of the other options) might still be connected to the original act, therefore it would not fully sever the connection. The context of significant complications or inadequate treatment would also likely leave room for the original act's influence in the causation chain.

Thus, only when